In this ethnographic sketch, I analyze the complex processes of Sino-Islamic identity formation by examining the variety and diversity of locally produced "authenticity," situated within a global understanding of Islam. Even within a single province, among a single official minzu (nationality) that People's Republic of China propaganda, media, and scholarship often construct as a unified, static group, localized practices and processes of identity formation are remarkably diverse. This article investigates how trans/national discourses and practices of Islamic authenticity are localized within two specific field sites: the provincial capital of Kunming and the rural Muslim enclave of Shadian. For the purposes of this article, I focus primarily on how life is temporally and spatially structured, both in everyday practice and in imaginings of one's place in history, modernity, the Muslim world, and the Chinese state. By setting out details of the daily lives of two Hui Muslim women, I aim to elucidate how temporal and spatial structures of life, which are tied to urban or rural location, reflect and shape local identity formation. I argue that as actors involved in their own self-production, Hui Muslims in Kunming and Shadian negotiated, appropriated, and contested both monolithic notions of Islam and the official statepropagated minzu classificatory system, producing their own versions of authentic Hui Muslim identities. What constituted authentic Hui Muslim identity depended to a great extent on the residence of the individual.
life, away from the corruptive influence of the city. For most urban Hui in Kunming, however, leaving the city was unthinkable: they had internalized and valorized the urban-rural hierarchy that saturates contemporary China, and that, while allowing for pastoral fantasy holidays in quaint or scenic rural destinations, discriminates against the rural in favor of the urban (see Jacka
2005; Siu 2007; Kipnis 2007).
For the purposes of this article, it is crucial to recognize that even though the rural-urban dichotomy is not static, Muslim lives in urban Kunming are quite different from Muslim lives in rural enclaves like Shadian. 5 The urbanized elite Hui Muslims with whom I worked in Kunming had to negotiate the dominant capitalist modes of living there, which included work hours that did not accommodate prayer times, along with the lack of a spatially connected Muslim district, inconvenient distance from mosques, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) religious restrictions, and other impediments to living a devout Muslim life. Some urban elite Hui negotiated this liminality by passing as Han in certain settings, even as their Hui Muslim identity was deeply felt. Despite their ambivalence, urban Hui accommodated, negotiated, and contested locally dominant modes of living in ways that enabled them to assert their own claims to Islamic authenticity. In comparison, state agents and capitalist modes of production exerted less authority in Shadian,
where Muslims were able to remake their religious authenticity after the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution.
Ethno-Religious Identity and Trans/National Belonging
Huizu 回族 (Hui nationality) is arguably the most ambiguous category of the ten Muslim shaoshu minzu 少数民族 (minority nationalities) in China: although the Hui officially comprise a minzu 民族 (nationality), the Huizu category noticeably lacks the defined, unifying traits by which minzu were differentiated in accordance with the Stalinist model of nationality, that is, "common language, common territory, common economy, and common psychological nature manifested in a common culture" (Fei 1981; Lin 1987; Harrell 1995; Gladney 1996; Lipman 1997; Litzinger 2000; Allès 2000) . While many of China's fifty-six official shaoshu minzu groups lack such a unified definition (see Harrell 1995 Harrell , 2001 Pan 1997 Pan , 2010 Litzinger 2000; Schein 2000; Tapp 2003) , and certainly, as many scholars have argued, the minzu shibie Chinese ethnic classification schemes, in addition to the Stalinist model (Fei 1989; Mullaney 2004 Mullaney , 2011 Fiskesjö 2006; B. Yang 2008) , the Hui category is especially problematic (Gladney 1996 (Gladney , 1998 Harrell 1995, 33; Lipman 1997) . Hui are scattered throughout China and claim descent from multiple ethnic groups. While most speak some variant of Chinese, others speak Tibetan or other minority languages (Gladney 1996, 32-34; Hillman 2004; Bai 2008) , and some speak Chinese dialects that incorporate transliterated Persian and Arabic words (Wang 1996 (Wang , 2001 . 6 Some scholars assert that belief in Islam ultimately defines the Hui (Z. Bai 1994; Israeli 2002 ), yet as anthropologist Dru Gladney (1996 Gladney ( , 1998 attests, there are those who identify as
民族识别 (ethnic identification campaign) of the 1950s drew on imperial and Republican
Hui but who neither believe in nor practice any form of Islam, such as the Ding lineage of
Fujian, who petitioned the Chinese state for classification as Hui based on their Arab and Persian ancestry. Gladney (1996 Gladney ( , 1998 ) posits a spectrum of Hui identities ranging from those who identify as Hui primarily on religious grounds, mostly located in Northwest China, to those like the Ding lineage, whose identity is based on other characteristics, including descent from foreign Muslims, cultural practices (such as abstaining from pork and endogamy) and a sense of shared history.
While the state-propagated minzu classification scheme strives for scientific objectivity, it paradoxically enables multiple, conflicting practices and discourses to exist within a single minzu category. Hence, we see the spectrum of locally produced Hui ethnic identities that Gladney (1996, 1998) describes and the processual, context-specific minzu that Louisa Schein (2000) , Nicholas Tapp (2002) , Kevin Caffrey (2004) , among others, articulate. With this in mind, I aim to emphasize that although the minzu shibie campaign and its subsequent nationality-focused state policies profoundly shaped the ethnic consciousness of China's peoples, Han and minority alike (see especially Gladney 1996) , the process of engendering minzu identities was far more complex than simply imposing state-designated categories onto on-the-ground social realities (Hansen 1999; Schein 2000; Litzinger 2000; Tapp 2002; Caffrey 2004; Fan 2012) . As Tapp (2002) argues, we must unravel the variety and diversity of authenticity by investigating locally produced constructions, particularly at the "sub-ethnic level," even when they are essentialist. In the case of Hui Muslims in Yunnan, "sub-ethnic" notions of transnational belonging-to the umma (community of Islamic peoples) and to an imagined cosmopolitanism more generallyadded yet another layer to the localized production of their identities. Local production of Hui Muslim identities was thus collaboratively influenced by national identification projects and notions of national belonging, notions of belonging to a specific minzu, and differentially formed notions of transnational belonging.
Below, I provide a glimpse into these divergent configurations of Hui Muslim practices and discourses by imagining a day in the lives of two ideal-typical Hui Muslim women, one living in Kunming, the other in Shadian. The two composites are directly based on my field notes, although I have merged multiple days, conversations, and interlocutors. During the "day in a life" sections, I use the ethnographic present in order to make the fictive aspects more visible, and to mark shifts from analytical passages.
Muslims in China are perceived as (at least) dually peripheral: as a group, they are peripheral both to the imagined center of the Islamic world and to mainstream Chinese cultural and political spheres. Yunnan's distance from China's urban and state centers-imagined and real, cultural, historical, economic, geographical, and political-produces yet another layer of peripherality for Hui Muslims there. Scholarly papers, local gazetteers, and popular Chinese discourses have long characterized Yunnan as remote (pianpi 偏僻) and peripheral (Skinner 1995; Giersch 2006; Tapp 2010) ; this was reinforced during the Qing, when Yunnan allegedly was plagued by a contagious miasma (zhangqi 瘴气) that afflicted Han government officials with malaria (Bello 2005; Zhang 2005 ). Even today, Yunnan is oriented not only toward Beijing but also toward Southeast Asia (Evans 2000; Michaud 2007; Scott 2009), 7 and Yunnan's reputation as a pleasant hub for tourists stems largely from its being imagined as an exotic paradise far from China's metropolitan centers (Xu 2001; Hyde 2001; Davis 2005; Ateljevic and Swain 2006; Zhang 2010) .
Kunming City: "Catching Up" with "Cosmopolitan Modernity"
Although Kunming may not be considered a major metropolitan center on par with Beijing, Shanghai, or Hong Kong, in the past decade the city has transformed from a far-flung provincial backwater into a shiny modern metropolis, complete with steel-and-glass skyscrapers, high-rise condominiums, luxurious gated communities, an IMAX cinema, three Starbucks coffeehouses, and even a Marc Jacobs retailer. In 2012, city officials unveiled a new subway system and launched a new international airport, reportedly the fourth largest in China. In the wake of China's economic reforms, the real estate market is "booming," private enterprise is flourishing, and officials and some residents, responding to a sense that Kunming is "lagging behind," have encouraged massive development projects in an effort to "modernize" the city (Zhang 2010 (Zhang , 2006 (Zhang 2010, 153-156; Zhu 2005) . While some residents and remnants of Shuncheng Jie's Muslim past remain, the site has been supplanted by a sprawling, shimmering temple to capitalist consumerism: an upscale shopping mall (figures 1 and 2). 
A Day in the Life of Mrs. Na of Kunming
Mrs. Na, fifty-eight, is a retired schoolteacher and homemaker who has long resided in Kunming. She wakes around 8 A.M. and prepares a breakfast of spicy mixian 米线 (rice noodles) for herself and her husband before he leaves for work. Everyday lives in Kunming are structured by the work patterns of capitalist production; as such, they generally do not accommodate scheduled prayer times, but rather conform to dominant Chinese temporalities with regard to sleeping, eating, and other aspects of daily life. After breakfast, Mrs. Na dons a pair of brown trousers and a long-sleeved aubergine blouse. She walks ten minutes through her luxuriously landscaped xiaoqu 小区 (residential community) to the bus stop, where she takes a bus fifteen minutes to the nearest well-stocked qingzhen 清真 (halal) market. She can buy a few items closer to home, but ever since she and her husband moved out of the city center she has had to commute at least fifteen minutes by bus to buy quality qingzhen meat. It is even farther to the nearest qingzhen bakery (figure 3).
Back at home, Mrs. Na phones her youngest brother in Ohio to update him on their parents' health problems. Her brother settled in the United States after attending a university there, and, like many urban Hui in Kunming, Mrs. Na values Western-style education, believing When her husband comes home shortly after noon, Mrs. Na finishes preparing lunch, an assortment of chaocai 炒菜 (stir-fried dishes), and sits down to eat with him. The couple discusses the upcoming Mid-Autumn Festival holiday. "It's not really our holiday; we should be celebrating Hui holidays. Why don't you ever get those off?" Mrs. Na complains. "You know why," her husband replies. "We Huizu technically have those days off, but if I miss work then, all my Han colleagues will notice and create problems for me. It's much easier this way. We can still spend time together as a family on the Han holidays, even if they're not really ours." After reading for a while, Mrs. Na begins to prepare dinner. Her daughter, Lingling, is coming over, so she will make her favorite dish: hongshao niurou 红烧牛肉 (red-braised beef).
Once both her husband and daughter have arrived, the family sits down to dinner together, complete with thimbles of qingkejiu 青稞酒 (barley wine). After several years as a businesswoman at a well-regarded local company in Kunming, Lingling has recently transferred to an international start-up, where she hopes her years of studying English can be put to good use. The family discusses how her job is progressing, and her mother guarantees Lingling's success. "We Huizu have a long history as successful businesspeople and traders. It's in our genes." After dinner, the family watches various game shows on television until the parents go to bed and Lingling returns to her apartment. 
Localizing Identity Formation in Kunming
Although Hui Muslims in Shadian often bemoan the "corruptive" process of "Hanification" (Hanhua 汉化) that has occurred in Kunming, the process of identity formation for Kunming Hui has been much more complex than mere assimilation. Kunming Hui argued that although they remained Muslims, the turbulence of the past fifty years had contributed to the gradual erosion of their religious beliefs. Religious suppression during the Cultural Revolution, assignments to danwei 单位 (work units) in which Han were the majority, practical conformities to dominant temporal structures in order to ease work relations, and the demolition of the Kunming Muslim District and subsequent dispersal of its residents all recognizably contributed to shifts in Kunming Hui identity formation, but not only by diluting this identity. According to Kunming Hui, the erosion of their religious beliefs and the lack of opportunities to practice Islam engendered within them a sense of ambivalence about their identity as Hui Muslims that eventually sparked a desire to cultivate a sense of "Huiness" that distinguished them from the Han majority.
Although some Hui in Kunming consume alcohol and even marry Han people, shared practices such as normative endogamy, pork abstinence, readings of lineages, and storytelling provide them with the means to distinguish themselves from the Han. As Mrs. Su, a fifty-threeyear-old middle school teacher, recounted in Kunming in October 2010:
When I was a young girl, I used to pray at the mosque with my mother. But then, during Wenge [the Cultural Revolution 文革], such things were no longer allowed. At home my mother told me stories of our ancestors and still tried to get me to nianjing [recite the Quran 念经], but the words meant nothing to me. They were just empty syllables, meaningless, and besides, that stuff just didn't interest me. Later, I was accepted to Yunnan Normal University and went to study in Kunming. I became a Chinese-language teacher at a middle school there.… Back then, no one wore the hijab [head covering]. It was the eighties, we just didn't wear it. I didn't pray either, and I began to think that the only thing that really separated me from my Han colleagues was that I didn't eat pork.… My mother always told me stories about our ancestors, so eventually I became interested in studying Huizu history, culture, and genealogy.
Through their own local practices, influenced by specific temporal and spatial modes, Kunming Hui constructed their own version of an authentic Hui Muslim identity predicated not on Islamic religious practice but on practices of reading a genealogy that, due to mythologized descent from Arab traders and/or the Prophet Muhammad, situated them at the center of the (Armijo 2001; Yang 1994) . Statistically, at least some of these cases of "patrilineal" descent must be at least partially matrilineal. A Kunming Hui Muslim woman of the Ding lineage acknowledged that "at least some" of the many Yunnanese Hui Muslim who claim patrilineal descent from Sai Dianchi must be refiguring that descent matrilineally, or through a combination of patrilineal and matrilineal descent.
However, she assured me that, in her own case, her patrilineal descent was indeed authentic: she traced her descent back to the Ding lineage in Fujian, and showed me documents that "proved" that her patrilineal male ancestor and his "younger brother" left Fujian for Nanjing during the Ming dynasty. She told me that the elder brother "remained Huizu," while "the younger brother became Hanzu." 13 Her ancestors slowly migrated westward and settled in Yunnan only after the In this repositioning of Hui Muslim authenticity, Kunming Hui disparaged prayer and the practice of "religious converts," instead articulating a uniquely Muslim modernity in which their own lack of prayer at once signified their authenticity as "true" descendants of "real" Muslims, and as vanguards of modernity, commerce, and science, further symbolized in their use of genetic "science" to assert their claims of authenticity. Here, Kunming Hui's hierarchical situating of themselves vis-à-vis other, less authentic, religious Hui, and other non-Muslim Chinese, resonates with how anthropologist Stacy Pigg (1996) untangles the ways in which the absence of traditional belief can become a marker of a modern identity: through voicing a lack of belief in shamanistic practices, "cosmopolitan villagers" in Nepal hierarchically positioned themselves as "modern," "scientific," and "advanced" in relationship to other, shaman-believing past glory to position it as a unique site in China, one that, in the words of a teacher at one of the local madrasas, "preserved the tradition of Islamic modernity." Before I visited Shadian, Hui interlocutors in Kunming insisted that spending time in Shadian was "crucial" for my research, and yet, at the same time, that it was too "dangerous" for me to go. Some claimed that Shadian sheltered "religious zealots" and even "Wahhabi terrorists." Rumors circulated that a "fortress" or wall encircled the township, built by the villagers themselves after the notorious Shadian Incident, in which, after a series of "uprisings" during the Cultural Revolution, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) launched heavy cannons and artillery and even used MiG jets to fire rockets in an attempt to quell "resistance," killing over a thousand Hui villagers and razing the village.
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Hopping off the bus on the highway outside of Jijie, I caught a lift into Shadian with friendly newlyweds and was astonished when we saw no walls nor met any resistance; rather, we glided into town via welcoming boulevards marked with signs in Chinese, Arabic, and English. Yang enjoys watching television series and news programs from the rest of the Muslim world, and feels that doing so connects her more to other Muslims' lives and experiences. When her husband comes home shortly after the noon prayers, she quickly finishes preparing a lunch of chaocai and sits down to share it with him. After lunch, she e-mails her son, who is in Syria studying to become an Islamic scholar.
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In the afternoon, several of her friends stop by for tea and light snacks: dates, apricots, and pastries imported from Turkey. Her friends are all Hui Muslim women in their forties and fifties who live in Shadian, but many of them were born in other parts of Yunnan or even in parts of China as distant as Lanzhou and Jinan. They moved to Shadian for the "strong Islamic atmosphere" (nonghou de yisilan fengqi 浓厚的伊斯兰风气). As one of their daughters exclaims, "If you walk around Shadian, you feel like you're not in China but instead in some advanced, modern city in the Middle East or maybe Pakistan or Malaysia. We even have palm trees!" (figure 5). The older women remark that Shadian is granted much more religious freedom than many other places in China, and that the "strong Islamic atmosphere" ensures, for example, that employers will provide Muslim workers with prayer halls and time off to pray during working hours.
The women chat about local affairs. Recently, a woman from Sichuan who studied for several years at one of Shadian's many madrasas returned to live in Shadian with her four children. After leaving Shadian, she had become a Chinese-Arabic translator in Guangzhou and eventually married an Iraqi man. The couple moved to Jordan, where they lived for over a decade, but when the husband died unexpectedly, the woman moved her family to Shadian, where she could count on community support. One woman from Lanzhou comments, "You know, more and more Zhongguo Musilin [Chinese Muslims] are marrying foreign Muslims. I heard that Lao Li's daughter met a Pakistani man on the Internet and they plan to marry soon.
And when Ma Laoshi returned from his studies abroad, he brought back a wife from Iran." "Well, and why not? Sharing the Islamic faith is the most important criterion for a marriage religious past, present, and future that temporally and spatially incorporates the umma as an entirety and marks them as members of that umma. After reading awhile, Mrs. Yang begins to prepare dinner, taking time to pray again around sunset. Once her husband is home, they have dinner together and decide to go watch the inter-mosque youth basketball tournament before evening prayers. Afterward, Mrs. Yang and her husband watch a subtitled Turkish TV series followed by a CCTV Arabic news program before they head to bed.
Localizing Identity Formation in Shadian
In contrast to Muslims in Kunming, Muslims in Shadian emphasized their attachment to the umma through their consumption of, for example, Turkish soap operas, Malaysian Islamic educations, and Jordanian halal foodstuffs; through these practices, they, too, imagine themselves as uniquely modern. Although Shadian may appear more isolated than Kunming, Muslims in Shadian have experienced on average far more actual cosmopolitan encounters than their counterparts in Kunming: through study abroad, hajj, meetings with foreign Muslims who visit Shadian, and even marriages with Muslims from abroad, in addition to imagined encounters via books, television, and other media.
In May 2011, I interviewed several women about Shadian's transformation following the economic reforms. When I asked specifically about the origins and processes of the prevalent Arabization in Shadian, everyone insisted that such "authenticity" had originated in the correct and pious practice of Islam there. However, in separate interviews and conversations with the same interlocutors, different pictures emerged. In one such interview, with Mrs. Feng, a housewife in her late forties, we discussed the changes that had occurred since the Shadian Incident. In the words of Mrs. Feng:
We prayed, but we didn't really know what it meant. After the Shadian Incident, we clung on to our faith even more strongly. But still, we didn't know what the words of the Quran meant. Even our imam didn't really know. In 1981, Ma Jian's translation into Chinese was published and finally we knew what it meant. He was a Shadian person but he left [in the 1930s] and never really came back. Still, we finally understood our own faith, and that really changed us all, especially because of [the Shadian Incident] . Almost everyone here lost someone in their family, and the pain is still deep, so we had to keep our faith close and pray to Allah. Having a Chinese-language version of the Quran helped with that, and Shadian became increasingly Muslim.… After gaigekaifang [the economic reforms and "opening up"], we had more exposure to Muslims in the rest of the world, and we began to practice the teachings of Islam more authentically. However, unlike those in Xi'an, Shadian Hui conceptualized the early PRC era (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) and especially the Cultural Revolution (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) as inducing an objectionable, forced break with an authentic, localized Islamic past. Their opposition to CCP religious policies materialized in the Shadian Incident, which in addition to being a traumatic lived and conversations about the social constructedness of ethnicity and the processes of re/producing identities. In current social scientific scholarship, it is taken for granted that ethnicity is socially constructed; however, as Bourdieu (2000, 108) has shown, deconstruction alone is not sufficient to demolish such social constructions. Indeed, ethnic primordialism runs rampant in today's globalizing world; one only has to look at contemporary America's fetishization of DNA to see how salient ethnic categories remain to the majority of the populace. For social scientists, this raises the question of how to conduct research on essentialized notions of ethnicity while remaining faithful to one's interlocutors without essentializing ethnicity in one's own scholarship. At the same time, many anthropologists' interlocutors themselves recognize the shifting, malleable process of identity production, and the ambiguity and arbitrariness of such notions as ethnic group, nation, or state. When these are the same interlocutors who in another breath essentialize their own ethnic identity, the process of identity production becomes even more tangled. More crucially, when one's essentialized ethnic identity means that one could be deported, imprisoned, or even killed, the stakes are no longer merely theoretical. criticize the government's anti-Uyghur bias, even as they themselves may benefit from it. A handful of cynics (understandably) note that the Chinese government purposely sows discord between the Uyghurs and the Hui in order to create cleavages that will forestall a Chinese panIslamic union.
Governmental favor potentially enables the Hui to cultivate the transnationalism to which they aspire, and also rebuilds trust between the state and the Hui. And yet, in order to maintain this trust, they must pursue forms of "authenticity" that are recognized (and recognizable) by the governmental authorities who control access to opportunities such as the hajj, relative religious freedom, and preferential policies. In order to benefit from their position as a model Muslim minority, they must perform all three of those roles: the model citizen, the Muslim, and the minority. This potentially forecloses opportunities to Hui who do not strive to strike a balance between assimilation to the majority and performance of state-sanctioned forms of "authenticity." Ultimately, however, it is up to Hui Muslim individuals and communities whether or not they would even be willing to perform such "authenticity." As it stands now, most of my interlocutors hope that the current tense climate will soon calm, and that they can continue to produce their own forms of "authenticity," (relatively) free from state pressure to do otherwise. Lipman 1997, xxiii; Gladney 1996 Gladney , 1998 Gladney , 2004 Harrell 1995, 34) . It is arguable that residual meanings of the term Hui continue to operate within self and community understandings of Hui identity (Williams 1977) . 2
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Regarding my use of the "imagined," I intend to invoke both Appadurai's (1996) sense of "imagination as social practice" and Anderson's ([1983] 2006) "imagined communities," particularly in the sense that imaginings "are to be distinguished not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined" (Anderson [1983] 2006, 6). 3
On biological "myths of descent" in the People's Republic of China (PRC), see Sautman (1997) . On Qing dynasty-era mythologizing of the origins of Islam in China, see H. Ma (2006) . On the mythologized descent of the Guo and Ding lineages in Fujian, see Fan (2003) . On the life and legend of an oft-claimed ancestor, Sayyid 'Ajall Shams Al-Din, see Armijo-Hussein (1997) . On genealogy as the basis for identity among Omani Muslims, see Limbert (2002) . Compare these different imagined Muslim descents to Boum's (2011) analysis of the mythologized origins and imagined pasts of Saharan Jews. In light of these differences in urban-rural patterns of Hui practice, I should mention that every Hui person I met during my fieldwork in Yunnan avoided pork, even if they drank excessively. That is not to say that they kept halal (that is, ate only foods permissible by Islamic law); some Hui in Kunming were willing to eat at non-halal restaurants so long as we did not order any pork. In addition, almost every household-urban or rural, religious or secular-possessed a copy of the Quran, typically keeping it in an honored place. These two cultural practices appeared to be the only ones that were consistently shared among all Hui I encountered in Yunnan. (Hill 1982 (Hill , 1998 Forbes 1986a Forbes , 1986b Forbes , 1988 Forbes and Henley 1997; Sen and Chen 2009). 8 Although consumer choices have certainly expanded in the wake of China's economic reforms and opening up, these sweeping historical and economic changes did not suddenly conjure a smorgasbord of expanded choices from which an individual consumer could freely pick and choose: what was valued and by whom were locally and collectively constituted. Local everyday consumer practices were shaped by powerfully intertwined global, national, regional, and local processes that both disciplined and enabled space for these creative appropriations, negotiations, and contestations of consumer practice. Individual yearnings for cultural capital and the social mobility that ideally accompanied it, in the realm of education, for example, played out locally in complex and various ways. 9
Sayyid 'Ajall Shams Al-Din, a Central Asian governor of Yunnan during the Yuan dynasty, is an oft-claimed ancestor of Hui in Yunnan (see Armijo-Hussein 1997) . 10
For more on Hui claims of descent from the Prophet, see Gao (2000) . 11
Such notable persons were viewed as having an inextricable connection to the Holy Quran, whether through jiyin 基因 (genes) or xuetong 血统 ("blood" lineage), as in the case of Arabs, or through religious authenticity, as in the case of imams or religious scholars, whose own ancestry was almost always traced back to an Arab, Persian, or Central Asian. 12
In the Du Wenxiu or Panthay Rebellion, see Bai (1953); Tʻien (1981); Wang (1995); and Atwill (2005). 13 It is fascinating that she employs twentieth-century terminology here, both in her use of the minzu category and in her refiguring of the elder-younger brother relationship, one so often used in post-1949 propaganda to show the Han elder brother guiding the shaoshu minzu younger brothers. Because she was certainly familiar with this typical hierarchical relationship, her appropriation potentially suggests a resistance to and reworking of it. 14 The vast majority of "cosmopolitan encounters" for Hui, urban or rural, are imagined, typically through books and electronic media, and even those that are not imagined could be classified as what Hebdige (1990) terms "mundane cosmopolitanism" (also see Szerszynski and Urry 2002) . Some elite urban Hui in Kunming occasionally vacation in the West, though usually as part of tour groups. A handful study at Western institutions abroad (where they are usually classified as "Chinese" by their non-Chinese friends) or, more often, at Western-style institutions in China where they encounter waijiao 外教 (lit. foreign teachers, most often English-language teachers). However, few urban Hui develop close relationships through these encounters, and, particularly when compared to the long-term relationships between some Shadian Hui and foreign Muslims, these urban Hui cosmopolitan encounters are only occasionally profound experiences for the actors involved. 15
For accounts of the Shadian Incident, see S. Ma (1989); Wang (1996) ; Gladney (1996, 137-140) ; Israeli (2002, 264-270) ; P. Ma (2008). 16 Shadian Hui Muslims explained the region's thriving economy in various ways, ranging from Allah's blessing to governmental reparations for the Shadian Incident. Whether or not it is blessed by Allah, the local economy benefits significantly from its mining industry, which is focused mainly on metals, including tin, copper, lead, zinc, silver, gold, and tungsten. 17
Since then I have spoken with her, and she told me he had moved to Malaysia to continue his studies. 18
Compare this to Gillette's (2000) description of a similar process of Arabization in Xi'an, where she posits that such styles excluded the Han majority (110) and were "attractive because they embodied the prosperity, technological development, and modernization of the Middle East" (233). In Shadian, however, the "meanings of change and the politics of pastness" (Appadurai 1996, 3) are quite different from those in Xi'an, and significantly influenced Shadian's notion of a return to authenticity. 19
Chinese scholar of Islam Wang Jianping (personal communication) raised the question: Why were Shadian Muslims able to ban alcohol successfully, whereas Muslims in Henan and Xi'an failed to do so? Shadian Muslims repeatedly stressed that because of specific historical and economic circumstances, particularly after the Shadian Incident, they were able to exert more legal and governmental authority locally than were Muslims in other parts of China. See also Gillette (2000, 167-184) on the failed alcohol ban in Xi'an's Muslim District. 20
These hadith and stories are too numerous to list here. In practice, Shadian Hui Muslim women are indeed relatively well educated, whether through state schools or Quranic ones, and many older local women continue to pursue Quranic education at one of Shadian's many madrasas. A surprisingly high number of local women have pursued bachelor's or master's degrees, and many women pursue careers and other leadership positions outside the home, even after marriage and children. Local women interpret Islamic prescriptions for modest dress and the wearing of gaitou 盖头/toujin 头巾 (hijab) as liberating: such styles of dress not only mark a woman's relationship with Allah but also enable her to focus on developing her intellect and other skills, safe in the knowledge that others will not judge her by her looks. Submitting to religious authority empowers some women (cf. Mahmood 2005) . Mosques, too, provide "spaces of their own" for women: women's mosques and female imams, rare or absent in other parts of the world, are common in China (Jaschok and Shui 2000, 2012; Allès 2000; Tatlow 2012 ). 21
Hanzu in Yunnan often deplore what they viewed as preferential treatment of the Hui by the government, at national, provincial, and local levels. This perceived preferential treatment consists of official preferential policies (youhui zhengce 优惠政策), as well as governmental actions allegedly based on a fear of Hui historical and genetic tendencies toward "violence" and "rebellions." According to many Han interlocutors, if any incident occurs between a Han and a Hui, the Hui people rush to defend their "brethren," so the government take careful steps to placate the Hui. Han in Yunnan often explain that this is due to the deep ethnic consciousness of the Hui, even though some Han believe this unification has no basis in genetic truth. Many Han express a desire that, like the Hui, they, too, could unite together as an ethnic group against others in China, and lament the fact that most Han lack a primordial ethnic consciousness and seem ambivalent about expressing ethnic pride. For more on Han views of Hui in Yunnan, see Blum (2001) , Caffrey (2007) , and Zhang (2010, 153-156) . See Allès (2003) for relationships between Han and Hui villages in Henan. See Carrico's (2013) dissertation for a fascinating ethnographic account of Han nationalism. For more on Han ethnic consciousness (and lack thereof) see the Mullaney et al. (2012) volume Critical Han Studies.
